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Abstract   In North Norway the dominant method of exchange for fresh and fro-
zen fish at the ex-vessel level is by direct (contract) sale, whereby price is
negotiated between fish processors and the fishermen. More recently, an auction
for frozen fish has been introduced. In this paper we investigate the relationship
of prices between these methods of exchange and, in particular, whether the
prices develop in a stable pattern between auction and direct sale by means of a
cointegration analysis. Monthly prices of size-graded cod and haddock landed
in the period 1997–2003 are analysed. For most months, frozen fish sold
through auctions realised the highest price, followed by direct sales of fresh and
frozen, respectively. Fish sold by auction exhibits a larger monthly variation in
price than fish sold directly. Prices for cod were cointegrated to a larger degree
than for haddock, and the cointegration was strongest for frozen cod. The analy-
sis also demonstrates that the auction prices for frozen cod and haddock drive
the direct sale prices of similar fish, both frozen and fresh, even though the
quantity sold via direct sales is greater than that of auctions. Law of one price
(LOP) and weak exogeneity were present for cod and haddock.
Key words   Market linkages, cointegration, auction sale, direct sale, fresh fish,
frozen fish, cod, haddock, North Norway.
JEL Classification Codes   Q22, C32, D44.
Introduction
Many fisheries are characterised by low profitability, and a common reason for this
status is declining catches from overfished stocks. There is a large literature on
methods to improve profitability in fisheries (Anderson 1986; Clark 1990;
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Hannesson 1993). Introducing restrictions in effort, catches, or some combination of
both can increase profitability. Most of this literature is focused upon raising profit-
ability in the long run by improving the regulation regime and reducing catch effort.
The literature demonstrating how to increase profitability in the fishery by increas-
ing the unit price (or value) of fish by market-oriented regulations is scarcer.
Trondsen and Johnston (1998) show that the possibilities for value adding in the
fishing industry are dependent on raw material control, and they argue that fish auc-
tions represent one way to add value if the processors do not control raw material
quotas. This paper analyses the effect of such fish auctions on market prices by
means of two mechanisms. First, auctions are supposed to be a more information-
efficient market organisation than a market with a regulated floor price. Second,
auction markets will force buyers to reveal their maximum willingness to pay better
than the existing direct sales system.
The importance of raw material control is supported by Ottesen and Grønhaug
(2002), who show that uncertainty in the supply of fish is a critical element in Nor-
wegian fish processors’ definition of market orientation. Dreyer et al. (1998)
showed that 50 of the 75 Norwegian fish processing firms analysed had invested in
vessels, yet only four of these got more than 50% of their supply from their own
vessels. The introduction of regulatory measures to reduce fishing effort often
causes political controversy, because in many cases, some effort has to leave the
fishery or everyone has to share reduced quota. However, despite this fundamental,
underpinning role of value, price has not received as much attention as it might have
within the literature. A major exception has been the study of cointegration of prices
in fish markets. Cointegration analysis is used to analyse relationships between non-
stationary time series price data. The method has become the most commonly used
for testing market integration and presence of Law of One Price (LOP) (Ardeni
1989; Asche, Bjorndal, and Young 2001; Asche, Salvanes, and Steen 1997; Gordon
and Hannesson 1996). Indeed, several empirical analyses of price linkages at differ-
ent levels in the seafood marketing chain using cointegration analysis have been
published recently (Asche, Bremnes, and Wessells 1999; Clayton and Gordon 1999;
Jaffry, Pascoe, and Robinson 1999; Asche 2001; Asche et al. 2002). There is also a
substantial literature dealing with the theory of stationarity, cointegration, and tests
for LOP and weak exogeneity (Muscatelli and Hurn 1992; Maddala and Kim 1998;
Harris 1995; Asche and Steen 1998). To set the context of this paper, the systems of
exchange for groundfish species in North Norway are described next.
Exchange Methods Used at Ex-vessel Sale of Fish
Two methods of exchange dominate the sale of fish: auctions and direct (or contract)
sales. Traditionally, auctions have been used in regions where a sufficient number of
buyers can congregate to compete, through price bids, for the fish landed. Fish pur-
chased may be sold fresh or be further processed for sale either locally, or more
commonly, outside the region. In regions using direct sales, the catch is often pro-
cessed into salted, dried, or frozen products that can be stored for a longer time.
In most fish auctions around the world, the traditional method is to bring the
catch to an auction building where it is graded prior to sale according to specified
criteria, including: species, size, and quality. Before selling by auction, the catch is
commonly divided into smaller units based upon fish of a given species, size, and
quality grade, making it easier for processors to specialise in particular products. In
the auction system studied in this paper, frozen graded fish are placed in neutral
(commercial) frozen storage. The fishermen’s sales organization (Norges Råfisklag)
then presents the fish via an electronic or telephone auction. More recently, the same
North Norway: Auction and Direct Sales of Fish 307
sales organisation has also started fresh fish auctions on a trial basis; however, these
are not included in this paper. By using auctions, the processors can access more
stable raw material supplies because catches from a larger range of vessels can be
aggregated, compared to a situation where the processor has to negotiate to buy fish
from individual vessels.
Through advances in Information and Communications Technology (ICT), it is
now possible to connect several auctions in one system of exchange, thereby en-
abling remote bidding, as found in Iceland (Arnarson and Trondsen 1998).
Completely remote auctions also exist for pelagic fish in Norway and groundfish
(demersal/whitefish) in North-West Norway, as described in Armstrong (2001),
where the fresh catch is auctioned whilst still onboard the vessel. In North Norway
the traditional and still dominant exchange method is direct sale, but for a number of
years some fish, mainly frozen, has also been sold by auction. Given the existence
of these different systems of exchange and the aforementioned importance of the
price obtained for catch, it seems logical to consider whether there are any differ-
ences in the prices realised for fish under different systems.
Existing Literature for Price Differences between Auctions and Direct Sales
The importance of relative bargaining power is probably one reason why auctions
are not more widespread worldwide; many fisheries take place in scarcely populated
regions where buyers are often few and isolated. Another explanation is the season-
ality of many fisheries, which causes large quantities to be landed within a short
period of time and, conversely, low or no quantities for a long time. A few articles
have compared ex-vessel prices achieved through auctions and direct sales. The case
of Iceland has been considered by Arnarson and Trondsen (1998). Matthiasson and
Valsson (2000) suggest that possible reasons for the price difference in Iceland in-
clude the vertical integration of the fishing industry and the Individual Transferable
Quota (ITQ) system. In another study, Trondsen, Helstad, and Young (2003) found
the price of fish to be higher at auctions than direct sales in a comparison of regions
using auctions (Møre and Romsdal County, Norway, Scotland, and Iceland) and oth-
ers where direct sales dominated (Iceland and North Norway). Price differences may
result simply from perceived differences in the product attributes of the fish sold.
Another reason may be the value placed upon the intangible service conferred
through the different selling systems. For example, auction sales typically subdivide
the catch into more homogeneous lots, thus providing greater scope for buyers to be
more selective in the raw material they purchase. This may be especially important
where the end product is being manufactured to a tight specification (as is com-
monly required in consumer markets). In contrast, direct sales tend to require the
purchase of a larger volume of product, if not all the quantity landed. This often in-
troduces a more heterogeneous raw material, which produces more varied end
products.
Service costs may also vary between the two systems of exchange. Auctions
normally require some physical infrastructure in which to display and grade the
catch then allocated to buyers. Although as noted, some pelagic fisheries operate on
the basis of remote auctions whilst at sea. Direct landings, especially in remote ar-
eas, simply supply direct to the buyer’s plant. It should also be noted that the
aggregation of buyers in itself may tend to influence the price received. According
to economic theory, a seller with low relative bargaining power is unlikely to get a
high price. Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show that a competitive auction of N+1
buyers will give the seller higher expected revenue than would be generated through
a monopoly selling position against N buyers. Thus an auction selling system might,
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in the fisheries sector, improve the social efficiency of the sector if the pricing sys-
tem is combined with restrictions on access to the fisheries; as in the situation of a
sole-owner system. Certainly, the presence of more buyers will tend to heighten
competition for the fish on sale.
Price Links between Auction and Contract Sales
The following analysis initially demonstrates the presence of price differences be-
tween auction and direct sales of cod and haddock in North Norway, where all
vessels in this study have the same fishery management system. Given the homoge-
neous fisheries management system, this study postulates that observed differences
in levels of ex-vessel prices may be explained by differences between the two paral-
lel systems of exchange. The analysis looks at ex-vessel prices for fish as a function
of exchange methods in the region by comparing direct sale prices to auction prices.
The prices for fish landed (gutted, head-off) between the two exchange methods for
cod and haddock landed in North Norway from January 1997 to December 2003 are
compared. The price of frozen fish sold by auction is compared to the price of fish
sold fresh or frozen by direct sale. The quantity of fresh fish that is auctioned in the
period analysed is negligible compared to the other categories, and there are many
months where no auctions of fresh fish occur. Because of this, fresh fish sold by
auction is not included in the analysis.
Clark and Munro (1980) incorporated a monopolistic processing sector in a dy-
namic bioeconomic model. One of the results from their analysis was that a
processing sector with market power might result in a price system closer to the so-
cial optimum. This effect could be countered by fishermen creating a raw fish
monopoly. Historically, this is exactly what has happened in the Norwegian fisher-
ies. As we will demonstrate, the recent introduction of auctions has further changed
the price level to the benefit of the fishermen. Larkin and Sylvia (1999) developed a
model where improved intra-seasonal allocation of a fish resource might increase its
value. In the study, the fishing sector was assumed to be vertically integrated and
the first-hand price would, thus, only affect the allocation of profit, not the total
profit. We assume the fishing sector and the processing sector are independent and
make transactions based on either auction prices or regulated spot prices with a
minimum floor price that may be binding. The social optimality of the fishing sector
is not achieved by means of regulated prices or taxes/subsidies, but by quota regula-
tions and regulation of fishing effort.
Economic theory concerning prices realised under different exchange methods
and other empirical evidence analysing the effects of exchange methods, suggests
that auction prices will be higher than direct sales prices (Trondsen, Helstad, and
Young 2002; Arnarson and Trondsen 1998). The first question will be to establish if
there is, in fact, a stable price difference for identical species in the same geographic
area for the same period, but traded through the two different systems of exchange:
auction and direct sales. This first part is partly descriptive, with the purpose of es-
tablishing a basis for the next hypotheses that will be tested formally. The first
hypothesis to be tested is whether there are stable, long-run price relationships be-
tween the prices revealed through the two exchange methods. To answer this, a
bivariate cointegration analysis for the two exchange methods for different sizes of
cod and haddock is undertaken. If the prices are cointegrated, a long-run price link
exists. If the hypothesis is not rejected, we may then conclude that the price
cointegration indicates the presence of LOP. Next, based on the presumption of non-
rejection of the first hypothesis, we will test for exogeneity, which are statistical
(but not necessarily logical) indications of cause and effect. Tests for weak
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exogeneity will be formulated to find whether the auction price drives the direct sale
price in the long run, or vice versa. All formal tests are based on studies of price
series. More general equilibrium models intended to explain differences in prices,
based on supply and demand functions for each market, have not been investigated
in this study.
Ex-vessel Sales of Whitefish in North Norway
In North Norway the fishermen’s sales organisation, Norges Råfisklag (NR), holds
the exclusive legal right to organise ex-vessel sales of all groundfish landed in the
region (Christensen and Hallenstvedt 1990). The region consists of the counties
(from North to South) Finnmark, Troms, Nordland, Nord-Trøndelag, Sør-Trøndelag
and part of Møre and Romsdal county, south to the city of Kristiansund. Direct sales
predominate, historically in part because of the geography of the region, which con-
sists of many small islands and large fjords requiring fishing vessels to travel
relatively long distances between local buyers. Also, the fisheries are highly sea-
sonal and the region is sparsely populated. Before the introduction of laws leading
to the establishment of NR, local buyers regularly developed local monopolies, tak-
ing advantage of the difficult negotiating position of the local fishermen. Following
the legal change, NR was empowered to set the business rules for ex-vessel sales of
whitefish in the area, including a minimum legal price for each species, size, and
area. In addition, NR certifies fish buyers and guarantees that fishermen get their
payment for the catch. The minimum price is agreed upon in negotiations with rep-
resentatives for the buyers. This minimum price is valid both at the auctions and for
direct sales and is set at a level intended to secure some profitability for both buyer
and seller (Christensen and Hallenstvedt 1990). To facilitate sales, NR may help
fishermen to contact buyers in the region or sell the catch at the NR-organised auc-
tions.
For some years, NR has organised an auction primarily for frozen fish in the re-
gion. Frozen fish is auctioned either from a cold store or prior to landing of the
frozen-at-sea (FAS) catch. Fish auctioned from a cold store may be divided into
smaller, more homogeneous units of species, size, and quality. Buyers incur the cost
of transport from the cold store to the processing plant, whereas fish bought from
the boat will be discharged directly at the plant.
Unlike a conventional shout auction, NR sends product details and the name of
the fishing vessel to prospective buyers who are invited to return bids by fax within
a specified time period; NR then attempts to raise bids by telephone. It is mainly the
larger trawlers and auto-long-liners that sell their catch at auction (Norges Råfisklag
2001). The same standard fees are charged for the auction and landing elsewhere in
the region. The costs of unloading and storing the catch average about 0.30 NOK
per kilo landed, or 0.20 NOK/kg live weight. Having ascertained the organisational
structure of the exchange process, this analysis is next directed to any price differ-
ences between the two exchange methods and whether there are any long-run, stable
relationships in the fish prices commanded.
Landings of Cod and Haddock in North Norway, 1997–2003
The analysis is based on monthly data of landings of cod and haddock in North Nor-
way from NR over the seven-year period January 1997 to December 2003. The
disaggregated data include species size, form (fresh or frozen), and the exchange
method for fish landed gutted, head-off. These landings accounted for an average of
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about 87% and 65% of total yearly landings of cod and haddock, respectively, dur-
ing this period. The remaining fish were landed in other forms, such as fillets;
whole, or gutted, head-on. The size grading used in the analysis is identical to the
one used by NR to set minimum legal prices, and the three size categories for live
weight cod are <1.5, 1.5–3.8, and >3.8 kg. Haddock is divided into two categories:
above and below 1.1 kg. Prices in the analysis are calculated in live weight equiva-
lents (LWE). Average monthly landings of the two species according to size,
exchange method, and product form landed for the period 1997–2003 are presented
in table 1.
Table 1 shows that direct sales of fresh fish are the dominant exchange method
for most size categories, especially for large fish. For frozen fish, direct sales are
important for medium and particularly small fish. For fish sold by direct sale, both
cod and haddock, an increasing proportion of landings were landed frozen. One ex-
planation for this is a well-documented switch in foreign landings of Russian boats
from fresh to frozen fish. The proportion of cod landings sold at auction relative to
total landings is quite stable during the period analysed. For haddock, on the other
hand, sales at auctions have declined both absolutely and relatively. There has been
a decrease in fish sold fresh for both species.
The variation in the monthly volume landed differs between the three exchange
categories. For large cod, direct fresh sales have the largest percentage variation in
landed quantity during the year, followed by auction sales of frozen cod. Direct
sales of frozen cod have the smallest percentage variation in quantity during the
year. The landing pattern is different for medium and small cod, where auction sales
in most years have the largest variation, followed by fresh fish at direct sale. A rea-
son for the difference between large and smaller cod is that Norwegian coastal
vessels catch large cod migrating to and from the spawning grounds. The remaining
fleet, especially trawlers, catch more immature fish on the feeding grounds through-
out the year. When analysing the haddock landings pattern, the percentage variation
between the different landing conditions is smaller than for cod. A reason for the
differences between species may be the greater importance of cod (especially large),
in relation to all landings, and because of the large proportion of landings which
come from the coastal fleet.
The description above shows large variations in the quantity landed of the two
species between both the different exchange methods and product forms. Next, the
analysis turns to the possible price links between the two species and the exchange
methods for the same period as before.
Monthly Prices for Different Sizes, Product Forms, and Exchange Methods
Cod is the most commercially important species in the area, and table 2 and figures
1 and 2 show monthly live weight prices of the three different sizes of cod as a func-
tion of exchange method and whether landed fresh or frozen.
Figure 1 shows that the price of cod increased during the period analysed for all
exchange methods and that price increased as a function of the fish size. In 2001,
the price of cod stabilised, then began to decrease. In all categories, prices are high-
est from September into April, peaking in November and March. Auctions realised
the highest prices in all categories in most of the months, whereas fresh cod sold di-
rectly got the lowest price in most months. The smaller monthly variations in direct
sale prices for fresh cod, compared to the two other categories, may be because a
greater quantity of cod is landed fresh and sold by direct sale and consequently has a
more stable price pattern. Another reason for this may be that that fresh fish at direct
sale gets the lowest price, the minimum legal price, and so acts as a floor price. In
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Figure 1.  Live Weight Price of Large, Medium, and Small Cod Sold Fresh and Frozen
at Direct Sale and Frozen at Auction on a Monthly Basis: January 1997-December 2003
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Figure 2.  Live Weight Price of Large and Small Haddock Sold Fresh and Frozen at
Direct Sale and Frozen at Auction on a Monthly Basis: January 1997-December 2003
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figure 2, the prices of haddock for the two size categories are shown according to
exchange method and whether the catch is landed fresh or frozen.
Figure 2 shows an increase in the price of haddock until late 1998, after which it
stabilises until a decline in 2002. The price pattern for the different exchange meth-
ods for haddock shows a similar trend to that described for cod, having the highest
price for frozen haddock at auction and lowest for fresh at direct sale in most
months.
Based on the observed price relations and landing patterns over this seven-year
period in North Norway, the analysis will next consider price differences between
the two exchange methods and if there is a long-run relationship between the differ-
ent exchange systems and frozen and fresh product forms.
Price Links between Auction and Direct Sale Systems
The figures presented earlier show price differences between the two exchange sys-
tems and that prices fluctuate during the period. The following will test for market
integration between the two exchange systems by using cointegration analysis.
Monthly ex-vessel prices in the period January 1997-December 2003 (84 observa-
tions) are considered. All prices were transformed into the natural logarithm before
the cointegration analysis was conducted.
Tests of Stationarity
The first step in the analysis of statistical relationships between the two exchange
methods is to determine whether or not the time series data are stationary. This was
done using two alternative versions of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test
model. The first version includes a constant only; the second version includes both a
constant and a trend coefficient. The ADF is based on the regression equations
shown in equation (1), where both the constant and a time trend are included:
DXt = b0 + b1 × t + (r - 1)Xt- 1 + bgDXt-g
g=1
k
å
+ ut, (1)
where D is the difference operator, b0 is a constant term, and b1 is a time trend term
(Dickey and Fuller 1979). The null hypothesis, (H0), in the test is that the time series
is non-stationary, r  = 1, against the opposite, (H1), stationarity, r  < 1.
The ADF-t test statistics differ from the normal t statistics. Critical values are
calculated using the MacKinnon (1991) response surface estimates (Maddala and
Kim 1998). A lag length of 4 was used in the ADF test at level and a lag length of 3
at first difference. The results are shown in table 3.
Table 3 shows that all prices are non-stationary with or without a trend included
at the 5% significance level, except for medium fresh cod via direct sale with a con-
stant. The test of the time series at first difference shows that the first difference is
stationary for all time series at the selected lag length of 3. Inclusion of a time trend
does not change the picture. According to Gordon (1995) and Gordon and
Hannesson (1996), the power of the test to reject the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity decreases when the number of lags is increased. When experimenting
with shorter lag lengths, the results were consistent with the results described above.
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Results of the Tests for Price Linkages between Auction and Direct Sale
Two or more time series, each integrated to the order 1, I(1), are cointegrated if a
linear combination of the time series that is I(0), exists. The time series Xt and Yt,
each I(1), in equation (2) where g  is the cointegration vector, is cointegrated if the
error term, ut, is stationary, I(0):
ut = Yt - g Xt. (2)
This means that a long-run relationship exists between the time series even if the se-
ries themselves contain stochastic trends. Variables that are stationary in levels, I(0),
should not be included in the cointegration analysis.
We used the Johansen-Juselius procedure for testing cointegration between two
time series, t (Johansen 1988; Johansen and Juselius 1990). This tests for presence
of cointegration in a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model. The formal presentation
of the method is well covered in both textbooks and articles, and need not be re-
peated here.
The method identifies the number of independent cointegration vectors, ; if r = 0,
there is no cointegration. In our bivariate analysis there may be a maximum of one
cointegration vector, meaning that r can become 1 as maximum. The Trace-test and
the asymptotically equivalent Maximum Eigenvalue Test (Max Test), which tests the
null hypothesis of r = 0 cointegration vectors versus the hypothesis of r > 0
cointegration vectors, are used. The analysis reports on both tests. The results of the
test of cointegration between auctions and direct sales in North Norway are pre-
sented in table 4, which contains the test results calculated using the Max Test and
Table 3
Augmented Dickey-Fuller t-test Statistics ADF
Species Size Exchange Condition Price Levels First Difference
Constant Trend Constant Trend
Cod Large Auction Frozen –2.085 –1.687 –5.077** –5.454**
Direct Frozen –2.323 –1.847 –4.661** –5.042**
Fresh –2.425 –1.996 –3.974** –4.702**
Medium Auction Frozen –2.625 –2.235 –4.758** –5.148**
Direct Frozen –2.712 –2.128 –3.983** –4.639**
Fresh –3.057* –2.647 –3.472* –4.073**
Small Auction Frozen –2.616 –2.168 –3.839** –4.253**
Direct Frozen –2.832 –1.272 –6.324** –7.456**
Fresh –2.615 –2.320 –5.231** –5.471**
Haddock Large Auction Frozen –7.750 –2.089 –4.731** –5.116**
Direct Frozen –2.033 –1.434 –6.294** –7.431**
Fresh –2.040 –0.811 –4.253** –5.813**
Small Auction Frozen –1.416 –2.048 –5.293** –5.622**
Direct Frozen –1.994 –1.069 –5.224** –5.961**
Fresh –2.185 –1.483 –3.804** –4.432**
Notes: Level lag = 4; First Difference lag = 3.
* A constant is included in the ADF-model. ** A constant and a trend are included in the ADF-model.
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Table 4
Bivariate Cointegration Test of Price of Fish Sold Fresh or
Frozen by Direct Sale against Frozen Sold at Auction
Max Test Trace Test
H0: Rank = r H0: Rank = r
Species Size Condition r = 0 r £  1 r = 0 r £  1
Cod Large Frozen 27.73** 5.16 32.89** 5.16
Fresh 27.60** 4.54 32.13** 4.54
Medium Frozen 19.94* 8.05 27.98** 8.05
Fresh 20.10* 8.88 28.98** 8.88
Small Frozen 22.23** 9.18 31.41** 9.18
Fresh 22.10** 9.53* 31.62** 9.53*
Haddock Large Frozen 19.84* 2.76 22.59* 2.76
Fresh 16.06* 3.29 19.34 3.29
Small Frozen 18.43* 2.14 20.57* 2.14
Fresh 19.26* 2.52 21.77* 2.52
Lag = 3; ** 1% and * 5%.
Trace tests, respectively. A lag length of 3 was used and a restricted constant was
included in the analysis.
Table 4 shows that both the Max test and Trace test do not reject the hypothesis
of maximum one cointegration vector (rank £ 1) at the 5% level for all species and
size categories analysed, with the exception of medium fresh cod. The results of the
test of no cointegration vector, (r = 0), is consistent between the Trace and Max test.
Only in the case of small frozen haddock the tests do not reject the hypothesis of no
cointegration vector (r = 0) between direct and auction sales at the 5% level. The
two tests are asymptotically equal. The time series are considered to be cointegrated
if at least one of the tests indicates cointegration. In so doing, a weaker degree of
cointegration is accepted than Johansen and Juselius (1990), who recommend the
Max test because the Trace test tends to accept cointegration too often. In the fol-
lowing, we treat the time series as cointegrated if one of the tests indicates
cointegration.
Using the results of the Max test, the results show the prices of frozen cod sold
at auction to be cointegrated for all size categories of cod sold direct, both fresh and
frozen. Haddock is slightly less cointegrated than cod. Fresh, large haddock is not
cointegrated with auctioned haddock using the Trace test, and no combinations are
cointegrated at the 1% level.
Tests for Law of One Price and Weak Exogeneity
According to Stiegler (1969), goods can be said to be in the same market if they
make a stable, long-run relationship, LOP, as shown in the equation below:
ln pt1 = d + f ln pt2, (3)
where p1 and p2 is the price of goods 1 and 2, respectively.
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In the strict version of the LOP, d  = 0 and f  = 1 and the prices are equal, while
if d   ¹  0 and f  = 1, their levels differ due to factors such as transportation costs and
quality differences.
For non-stationary time series, it is not possible to test for presence of LOP by
making a regression and then testing for f  = 1. The Johansen test allows for testing
of the presence of proportionality between the variables in the long run and for non-
stationary time series by introducing restrictions of the variable b  using  likelihood
ratio test (Johansen and Juselius 1990). For the LOP hypothesis to hold on non-sta-
tionary time series, it is equivalent to testing whether b  = (1,–1) in the bivariate case
for cointegrated time series. A cointegration relationship between goods indicates
co-movement of the prices and is a less restrictive definition of market integration
than LOP.
The next stage is to test for the presence of LOP and weak exogeneity for the
cointegrated prices, including the weakly cointegrated time series. Table 5 shows the
results of the test for the presence of LOP and weak exogeneity for the price combi-
nations analysed. The test statistics are c 2 dist ibuted, with a degree of freedom of 1.
Table 5 shows a strong price link between auction and direct sales prices as the
LOP is accepted for all sizes analysed except for large cod, both fresh and frozen,
where the hypothesis of LOP is rejected at the 5% level. The results are in accor-
dance with the results from the bivariate cointegration tests.
By using restrictions of the a   in the Johansen test (Johansen and Juselius
1990), a test for weak exogeneity for each of the variables included in the analysis
can be done using a likelihood ratio test. We test if the price of product i drives the
price of product j. If the null-hypothesis, H0: a  = 0, is not rejected, the variable i is
exogenous. The test is then to analyse if one of the prices drives the other in the
long run.
The hypothesis of weak exogeneity for the auction prices is not rejected at the
5% level for any of the comparisons made. The hypothesis of weak exogeneity is
rejected for all of the analyses at the 5% level for the direct sales prices. Conse-
quently, this indicates that the direct sale prices of frozen fish are driven by the
auction prices in the long run.
Table 5
Test of Presence of LOP and Weak Exogeneity (P-value in Parentheses)
Weak Exogeneity
Species Size Condition LOP Price 1: Auction Price 1: Direct
Cod Large Frozen 4.11* –(0.04) 0.04 (0.83) 18.96** (0.00)
Fresh 4.08* –(0.04) 0.38 (0.54) 15.78** (0.00)
Medium Frozen 0.83 –(0.36) 0.00 (0.98) 8.51** (0.00)
Fresh 0.25 –(0.62) 2.05 (0.15) 8.68** (0.00)
Small Frozen 1.38 –(0.24) 1.65 (0.20) 13.05** (0.00)
Fresh 0.03 –(0.87) 0.19 (0.66) 12.55** (0.00)
Haddock Large Frozen 0.31 –(0.58) 0.51 (0.48) 15.08** (0.00)
Fresh 0.97 –(0.32) 0.55 (0.46) 11.31** (0.00)
Small Frozen 2.55 –(0.11) 0.35 (0.55) 15.73** (0.00)
Fresh 0.89 –(0.35) 0.00 (0.97) 16.72** (0.00)
Notes: ** 1% and * 5%.
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Discussion and Conclusions
The analysis clearly shows there are some price differences between fish sold at
auction and at direct sales in North Norway. Similarly, there are differences in the
prices of frozen fish sold at auction and both fresh and frozen sold by direct sales.
For comparable species and size grades, the auction prices are higher. The literature
analysing price differences between direct sales and auction sales suggests that ex-
vessel prices of fish sold at auction would exceed direct sales prices (Matthiasson
and Valsson 2000; Trondsen, Helstad, and Young 2002). This is reconfirmed in this
paper. The cointegration tests for cod showed generally strong price links between
auction and direct sales, and the price links were weakest for grades where auction
sales are small. The price differences may be due to the different levels of competi-
tion for fresh and frozen fish that dominate the two exchange methods. Also, when
sold straight from a vessel through direct sale, each batch of fish tends to be larger
than when sold at auction. In addition to larger batches, the catch composition may
be more heterogeneous both in fish size and species. Thus, there may be both a
quantity and a quality effect to explain differences in price levels.
A further contributory factor for at least some of the price differences observed
may be because buyers commonly incur unloading and handling charges in direct
sales, whereas the fishermen absorb these when selling through auctions. Perhaps
more importantly is the fact that larger quantities of fish are sold through direct
sales than by auction, and there are larger seasonal variations in landings sold di-
rectly, especially for fresh fish.
The species analysed are of great commercial importance in the region, but the
cointegration results showed some differences when comparing cod and haddock. In
terms of the target market, the EU dominates for both cod and haddock. In previous
analyses for price links between several countries, it has been suggested that effec-
tively one market for whitefish exists (Gordon and Hannesson 1996; Asche, Gordon,
and Hannesson 2002). This analysis has a more local approach. We have shown that
the price relationship, in terms of degree of cointegration, is stronger for frozen fish
sold at an outside auction than for frozen fish sold at auctions and fresh fish sold
direct. Similarly, there is shown to be a stronger price relationship for cod sold at
auction and outside auctions than is the comparable case for haddock. This may well
be because frozen fish sold by the two exchange methods are closer substitutes fur-
ther down the distribution chain than frozen and fresh fish.
We have also demonstrated that for the Norwegian cod and haddock markets,
the auction prices for frozen fish will drive the direct sale prices of both frozen and
fresh fish—not the other way around—even though the quantity sold via direct sales
is larger than that by auctions. In our study, we had no observations from a fresh
fish auction market. This absence of a fresh fish auction market may explain our re-
sults, which contrast with most other studies of the relationships between fresh fish
and frozen fish markets. Other studies show that fresh fish prices are normally
higher than frozen and that fresh fish auction prices drive the frozen fish prices and
direct sales prices of all kinds of fish (Gordon and Hannesson 1996; Arnarson and
Trondsen 1998; Trondsen, Helstad, and Young 2002). Fresh fish are preferred and
command higher prices than frozen fish in most markets where consumers can exer-
cise choice (Trondsen 1997a). This has been documented in a number of fisheries
around the globe, including the Canadian case of fresh fish trade in individual Pa-
cific halibut quotas (Sjøholt 1997), and more commonly in groundfish sold in
European auctions and farmed Atlantic salmon exports from Norway and other EU
producers (SFIA 2002). Generally, the lack of a supply response to consumer prefer-
ences indicates the existence of some barriers to market orientation (Trondsen
1997b). In this particular Norwegian case, one explanation is that the supply barriers
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are related to the existence of frozen fish auctions and the lack of fresh fish auctions
that could serve as differentiating price leaders.
The test of weak exogeneity shows that the presence of auctions affects prices
realised through direct sales and that auctions open up further possibilities for add-
ing value in the region. Given the conduct of the exchange process, it might also be
hypothesised that auction prices are more transparent and send clearer, more fre-
quent signals to the market than do direct sales. If this is so, auction prices are more
market informative than the direct sales prices. NR is aware of this positive effect of
auctions and intends to increase their use of them in the future, including fresh fish
auctions (Myrvang 2003). In doing so, the fishermen’s sales monopoly might expect
to realise the advantages of a fish auction in the fresh fish value chain, as has al-
ready been demonstrated in the frozen fish value chain. Currently, the lack of fresh
fish auctions reduces the market signals of consumer preferences and, hence, oc-
cludes both the market value of the fishers’ catch and consumers’ satisfaction with
fresh fish supplies.
Although the introduction of fish auction markets has resulted in the efficient
transmission of information, an increase in the average level of prices, better alloca-
tion of fish through the distribution channel, and possibly improvement in the value
adding of the sector, many still oppose them. There are many vested interests in
maintaining non-efficient markets (Porter 1980). In addition, legitimate distribution
objections may be relevant, and this analysis takes no account of possible local em-
ployment effects. Whilst many of these problems belong more in the political arena,
rather than the ambit of this article, the findings may help formulate future policy
decisions on the adoption of different systems of exchange.
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